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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
The word "identical" is defined as "exactly the same' for all practical put-
p6ses."39 Thus an identical interest can be said to be an interest exactly the same
as another interest for all practical purposes. It must be admitted that identical
interest alone will not bind the non-appealing defendant to the previous judgment
merely because he participated in the defense.40 This is true even if he had an
identical interest with an interest previously litigated since his interest may not
have been set forth or defended so as to come within his constitutional guarantee
of due process of law.41 But the writer believes that the non-appealing defendants'
right to their day in court can be waived by certain conduct on their part. There is
authority to the effect that if one prosecutes a suit to protect his. own right or
assists in prosecution of an action in aid of some interest of his own and
controls that action, although the suit is brought in name of another, he is bound
by the judgment.42 It appears that a question of fact arose whether the non-
appealing defendants participated to the extent that they might be bound by the
judgment on stipulation for judgment absolute. It is submitted that in view of the
question of fact, the majority, while applying the statute literally, failed to con-
strue the statute liberally, and was in error in holding, as a matter of law, that no
question of fact existed.
Mufualify of Esfoppel
Where the liability of a defendant is based in part upon the act of a third
party, it does not strike unfairly that a plaintiff, who has failed in a prior action
against that third party, should be prevented by res judicata from raising again
the identical issues decided in the prior suit.43 This indeed would seem to be most
in accordance with the underlying policy of res judicata, i.e., interest repi~blicae ut
sit fizis" litium.44 Yet such a result must be reached with some difficulty by the
courts because of a verbal stumbling block. As has been said, "The repetition of a
catchword can hold analysis in fetters for fifty years or more."45 The catchword
here is "mutuality."
Under the doctrine of "mutuality of estopper' a.party is precluded from
asserting a judgment in estoppel unless he would also be estopped had the same
judgment gone the other way; or, in other terms, the judgment must be equally
conclusive on both parties.46 Most reasons advanced for the rule, such as fairness,47
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); Cain v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 76
So. 337 (1917).
40. See note 37 supra.
41. U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1; N. Y. CONsT. art I, §6.
42. Flynn v. Colonial Discount Co., 149 Misc. 607, 269 N. Y. S. '2d 893 (City
Ct. 1933); of. Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N. Y. 428, 160 N. E. 775 (1928).
43. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS§99 (1942).
44. Good Health Products v. Emerj, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. 2d 758 (1937);
45. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1931),.
46. Nelson . Brown, 144 N. Y. 384, 39 N. E. 355 (1595),
47. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §429 (5th ed. 1925).
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or judicial recognition that many suitors gauge their efforts to the.importance of
their opponents,48 have been found wanting. 49 It is plausible that the mutuality
concept is a carry-over from the time when parties could not be witnesses and
-there was fear that a third party might later take advantage of a judgment obtained
upon his own testimony.50 But whatever the origin or rationale, the doctrine that
estoppels must be mutual has been assumed by New York courts without
examination. 5l
Certain exceptions have arisen, however, where the relationship between the
party asserting the estoppel and the party whose rights were affirmed in the prior
suit is that of master and servant, principal and agent, or indemnitor and indem-
nitee. The leading New York case which circumvented the mutuality rule is Good
Health Products v. Emery,52 in which the owner of a vehicle involved in a col-
lision was allowed to use defensively a judgment in favor of the driver of the
vehide in an earlier suit against the present plaintiff. However, the effect of this
decision was seemingly limited by Elder v. New York & Penn. Motor Express,
Inc.,15 3 in which Judge Finch (who also wrote the opinion in the Good Health
case) said, "If . . . we eliminate in the rule followed in the Good Health case,
the necessity of the liability being dependent on the negligence of a servant...
then it would seem that we would eliminate entirely the requirements of mutuality
of estoppel and privity."54
In the recent case of Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., Inc.,5  the plaintiff brought
an action against the defendant Wood Dolson for breach of contract, combining
with it an action against one Gross for inducing the breach. The actions were
severed and the contract action tried first, resulting in a dismissal of the complaint.
No appeal was taken. Thereupon Gross amended his answer to plead that judg-
ment as an estoppel and moved for a summary judgment.16 The motion was
denied by Special Term, which held that the judgment bound only the parties in-
48. Moszisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299, 303 (1928).
49. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P. 2d 892 (1942).
50. Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396 (1872).
51. The Atlantic Dock Co. v. Mayor, 53 N. Y. 64, 68 (1873); Haverhill V.
International By. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N. Y. Supp. 522 (4th Dep't 1926),
aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E. 905 (1926).
-52. 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. 2d 758 (1937).
53.. 284 ,N. Y. 350, 31 N. E. 2d 188 (1954).
54. See note 53 supra, at 353, 31 N. E. 2d 188, 191 (1940).
55. 1 N. Y. 2d 116, 134 N. E. 2d 97 (1956).
56. "The effect of an adjudication as res judicata is not confined to subse-
quent independent actions or proceedings, but is equally applicable to all ancil-
lary or collateial proceedings, in the same suit . . . ." 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
§927(a) (5th ed. 1925). The doctrine of the 'law of the case" Is limited to
subsequent proceedings of the same case, Scott v. Scotts Bluff County, 106 Neb.
355, 183 N. W. 573 (1921), involving orders which are interlocutory, Walker v.
Gerli, 257 App. Div. 249, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 942 (1st Dep't 1939), and the same par-
ties or their privies, Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U. S. 129 (1920).
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volved on the trial or their privies, and further that mutuality of estoppel was
lacking. The Appellate Division reversed 57 and was upheld by the Court .
Here there is neither privity nor derivative'liability. Yet, relying pri'ncipally
on the Good Health case the Court held that the underlying principles of thb
exceptions to the mutuality rule-that a complaining patty who has had a full
opportunity to litigate certain issues should not be permitted to relitigate the
identical issues5 s in a new action, and further that the policy behind res judicata is
that it is in the interests of the state that there be an end to litigation--estopped
the plaintiff.
While the Court emphasized that it was not adding a new class of exceptions
to the general rule (the Court did not refer anywhere to the Elder case), it would
seem that, in the face of an anomolous result, it has indeed done so. This decision
indicates that though the courts may continue to pay their respects to the mutuality
concept, the letter of the rule will not defeat the spirit of the doctrine of res
judicata.
Appeal-Certified Questions
Meenan v. Meenan"9 involved an appeal upon certification of a question, by
the Appellate Division who had reversed 0 the granting by Special Term' of a
motion for temporary alimony and other interlocutory relief. The'question asked
the Court of Appeals was whether "upon the facts presented", Special Term
properly exercised its power and authority in granting the plaintiff's motion.
Hilton IVatch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co. 61 was a like appeal upon certification by
the Appellate Division, who had upheld 62 the denial by the Special Term of a
motion for leave to serve a supplemental complaint. This question asked whether
the Special Term was correct in its denial. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeals upon the ground that the appellant in each case had failed to comply with
57. 285 App. Div. 718, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 663 (1st Dep't 1955).
58. The Court laid great stress on this factor; query whether a plaintiff,
in a negligence suit in New York against a joint tort-feasor, where the plain-
tiff had 'lost in a- former action against defendant's joint tort-feasor because
of a failure to prove freedom from contributory negligence, could be barred
by "res judicata" because of such "identical issue"?
59. 1 N. Y. 2d 269, 135 N. E. 2a 30 (1956).
60. '286 App. Div. 775, 147 N. Y. S' 2d 122 (1s" Dep't 1955).
61. °1 N, Y. 2d 271, 135 N. E. 2d 31 (1956).
62. 282 App. Div. 939, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 193 (1st Dep't 1953).
